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Abstract 
 The justices of the United States Supreme Court are perhaps the most powerful individual policymakers in 
the nation; it has therefore been imperative for political scientists to discover the decision-making process of the 
justices.  Three models, the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models, have gained prominence among Court research-
ers.  The attitudinal model enjoys the most robust empirical support, especially for constitutional civil-rights cases.  
One area of constitutional jurisprudence, the Court’s search and seizure rulings, has been extensively examined 
through the attitudinal model; the research to date, however, focuses on “legal” case facts as determinants, neglect-
ing the possibility that “social” case facts, which have no bearing on the legal status of the search and seizure, 
might influence the decisions of the justices.  My hypothesis is that these “social” facts do indeed affect the justices’ 
decisions in substantial and significant ways.  In particular, I will focus on the effect of Drugs as items seized in a 
search and crimes related to drugs, which I hypothesize will have particularly substantial and significant impact on 
the justices’ findings as to the reasonableness of the search.  As to the first part of my hypothesis, “social” case 
facts do not appear to exercise substantial or significant effects on the justices’ decisions.  Drugs as items seized and 
the drug Trafficking crimes are notable exceptions to the general lack of significant impact from “social” case 
facts, consistent with the second part of my hypothesis.1 
Introduction 
 Few items of political science examination have generated as much interest and intense 
study as have the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  Few individuals are able to ex-
ercise as immense an influence over the public policy of the nation as are the Justices of the Su-
preme Court; further, their decisions bear most directly on the interpretation of the United States’ 
founding document.  Thus, veritable barrels of ink have been spilled in the attempt to accurately 
predict the decisions of the justices through scientific models.  Three such models have gained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I would like to thank Professor Lawrence Baum for his invaluable support and assistance in constructing this the-
sis, especially as regards the statistical analyses.  I would also like to thank Professor Jeffrey Segal for his tremen-
dous generosity in providing me his dataset.  I am additionally grateful to Professors Zachary Peskowitz and Piers 
Turner for participating in the defense of this thesis. 
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prominence: the legal model, the attitudinal model, and the strategic model.2  Of these three, the 
attitudinal model, which holds that “the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of 
the case vis-á-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices,”3 has gained the most cur-
rency among political scientists.4  The attitudinal model has gained significant prevalence in the 
study of the Court’s decision-making as regards Fourth Amendment cases.  The Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution dictates: 
The Right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.5 
Thus, when confronted with Fourth Amendment cases and controversies, the justices are called 
upon to decide on the “reasonableness” of the search in question. Much of the research to date 
from the attitudinal model as regards the reasonableness of a search has focused on the impact of 
what are called “legal facts,” i.e. those case facts that bear on the legal status of a search, includ-
ing the existence of a warrant, the location of the search, findings of probable cause, exceptions 
to the warrant requirement, whether the search and seizure was conducted in connection with an 
arrest, and the decision of the lower court6; however, it is not unreasonable to suppose that “legal 
facts” are not the only facts about which justices hold “ideological attitudes and values” that 
might bear on their findings regarding the reasonableness of a search.  The justices might hold 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The models are not, for the most part, singular unified models, but rather a collection of separate models that oper-
ate on differing fundamental assumptions; this is especially true of the “strategic model,” which is in fact a collec-
tion of models that take into account various eternal influences on the Court.  These models will be further explicat-
ed in the Decision Making by the Supreme Court section. 3	  Segal & Spaeth (2002), page 86. 4	  Epstein & Knight (1998); Pacelle, Curry, & Marshall (2011); Epstein, Landes, & Posner (2013). 5	  U.S. Constitution Amendment IV. 6	  Segal (1984, 1985, 1986); Segal & Spaeth (2002); Kritzer & Richards (2005). 
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certain attitudes in regards to what I call “social facts,” i.e. those case facts that do not bear di-
rectly on the reasonableness of a search, but nevertheless may influence the justices’ decisions.  
These facts, the effects of which have to this point not been ascertained empirically, include the 
type of items seized in a search and the nature of the charge brought against the subject of the 
search.   
My hypothesis is that these “social facts” do indeed have a substantive effect on the deci-
sion-making of the justices in Fourth Amendment cases.  If the hypothesis bears out, it would 
seriously damage the normative notion that “it is law – and not the personal politics of individual 
judges – that controls judicial decision making,”7 even more than the empirical success of the 
attitudinal model already has.  While the justices might make attitudinally-motivated decisions 
regarding legal facts, at least the relevant attitudes have a legal vector; if it is shown that the jus-
tices’ social attitudes affect their decision-making, the notion that the justices are beholden to the 
law would be substantially undermined.  Such results would be disturbing for both conservatives, 
who are already unsettled by the implications of the attitudinal model, and for civil libertarians, 
who would be concerned with conservative attitudes about the social efficacy of preventing cer-
tain crimes or of the seizure of certain items having an effect on the judgment of the reasonable-
ness of a search.   
In the era of the “War on Drugs,” it is conceivable that attitudes regarding enforcement of 
drug laws might have particular significance in the decision-making of Supreme Court justices.  I 
therefore posit a second hypothesis, that variables related to drugs will have a particularly signif-
icant impact on the justices’ findings as to the reasonableness of searches.  If no such connection 
were probable, then Thurgood Marshall would have no need to remind the Court that “[t]here is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Harry T. Edwards, “Public Misperceptions Concerning the ‘Politics’ of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About 
the D.C. Circuit,” 56 University of Colorado Law Review 619 (1985) at 620, as cited in Segal & Spaeth (2002), page 
49. 
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no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism exception or an ex-
ception for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest.”8   If the justices weigh “social” 
facts heavily in their decisions, they will appear to be legislating their own social preferences 
from the bench rather than upholding or even reinterpreting law.  This would be extremely un-
welcoming for civil libertarians, who would be concerned that the rights of individuals with be-
haviors contrary to the justices’ social attitudes will face harsher challenges to their rights with-
out strong legal basis. 
 I will examine my hypotheses in five parts.  First, I will provide a background on Su-
preme Court decision-making scholarship, explicating the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models, 
and I will explain why the attitudinal model is the most appropriate for my purposes.  Second, I 
will lay out a brief history of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and present a review of 
attitudinal search and seizure scholarship.  Third, I will specify my variables and the methods for 
analysis.  Fourth will come the results of the analyses, followed by discussion of the implications 
thereof.  Finally, I will conclude with a reflection on the findings and how my research fits into 
the broader scheme of search and seizure research. 
Decision-Making by the Supreme Court 
 The decisions of the Supreme Court clearly have enormous policy implications; yet judg-
es generally tend to be quite private people, and their decision-making process is not entirely ob-
vious: it has therefore been necessary to make scientific inquiries in order to ascertain that pro-
cess.9  Three models of judicial decision-making procedure have gained prominence: the legal 
model, the attitudinal model, and the strategic model.  The legal model is the most familiar to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn. 489 U.S. 602 (1988), Marshall, J. Dissenting, page 641. 9	  Epstein, Landes, & Posner (2013) 
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broader public, and it is the legal model that is most often accepted by judges themselves.10  The 
model generally holds that “the decisions of the court are substantially influenced by the facts of 
the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the framers, 
and/or precedent”11; different jurists may ascribe different weight to each of these concerns.  Le-
gal models go by such familiar names as “Originalism,” “Legislative Intent,” and Stare Decisis 
(the doctrine of strict adherence to precedent).  These models have a great deal of normative pur-
chase: after all, judges write their opinions with a heavy reliance on precedent, often cite legisla-
tive or original intent, and frequently look to the founders to lend an authoritative voice to their 
writing; however, legal models enjoy almost no empirical support:12 the justices do not neces-
sarily stick to interpretations consistent with the legal models they would ostensibly favor.13  The 
terms “legislative intent” and “ intent of the founders” are ambiguous at best, given the incom-
plete records of the Constitutional Convention and disagreement among the founders, and legis-
lative intent may be too muddled to retrieve accurately from legislative records.14  Although jus-
tices express their opinions in terms of precedent, they “often ‘distinguish’ a precedent, holding 
that it does not govern the current case.  They may also narrow a case or overturn it altogether,”15 
although they rarely take the latter most course.  I find all of this quite unfortunate, as I believe 
the legal model has quite a bit of normative force and informs the way we think about the exer-
cise and benefits of the rule of law; however, I am writing as a social scientist, not as a legal phi-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Segal & Spaeth (2002).  A notable exception to this general tendency among jurists is Richard Posner, a judge on 
the US 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, who has endorsed a strategic model in a recent book coauthored with Lee Ep-
stein and William Landes. 11	  Ibid page 48. 12	  Segal & Spaeth (2002); Pacelle, Curry & Marshall (2011); Epstein, Landes, & Posner (2013). 13	  A notable example is the split of decisions in Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000), where the conservatives took a 
characteristically liberal position, and the liberals endorsed a characteristically conservative interpretation of the 
Constitution. (Segal & Spaeth 2002, page 1).  The Bush decision saw justices split against their ostensible “legalist” 
preferences and endorse positions in line with their perceived party preferences, suggesting attitudinal influence. 14	  Segal & Spaeth (2002). 15	  Baum (2010) page 120. 
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losopher, and it is eminently clear that the justices do not in fact adhere to legal models of deci-
sion-making. 
 A more realistic and empirically valid, if more normatively disturbing, Supreme Court 
decision-making model is the attitudinal model.  This model operates on the premise that ideo-
logical attitudes are the most salient factors for the justices in their decision-making process.  It 
traces its heritage back to the early “legal realists” such as Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and 
even Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.16  The novelty of the legal realists’ ap-
proach was that it recognized “that American judges exercise, at least occasionally (and at the 
Supreme Court level much more than occasionally), a legislative or policymaking role,”17 and 
that “[d]ecisions influenced by a political ideology are political, and many judicial decisions are 
so influenced.”18  Although they were on the cutting edge of social science in the early 20th Cen-
tury, legal realists could not have known about the validity of their approach without empirical 
confirmation.  Modern political science has provided such confirmation, and a plethora of studies 
have demonstrated the empirical strength of the attitudinal model,19 especially as regards Consti-
tutional civil rights cases before the Supreme Court.20  That is not to say that the attitudinal mod-
el is without critics: several political scientists have charged that the model is overly simplistic in 
leaving out legal factors that may be salient in decision-making21; and that it does not seek to ex-
plain strategic interactions between the justices themselves or between the justices and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Segal & Spaeth (2002); Epstein, Landes, & Posner (2013). 17	  Epstein, Landes, & Posner (2013) page 26. 18	  Ibid at page 27. 19	  Segal (1984, 1985, 1986); Hagle & Spaeth (1993); Segal, Epstein, Cameron, & Spaeth (1995); Segal & Spaeth 
(2002). 20	  Pacelle, Curry, & Marshall (2011); Epstein, Landes, & Posner (2013). 21	  Kritzer & Richards (2005); Pacelle, Curry, & Marshall (2011) 
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branches of government, nor explain non-voting decisions the justices make,22 such as whether 
or not to grant certiorari and opinion assignment. 
 Critics of the attitudinal model who seek an empirically valid method of predicting Su-
preme Court decisions have posited their own models, which are broadly called “strategic” or 
“rational choice” models.  These models assert that the justices operate in a framework of incen-
tives, constraints, and interactions that necessitate “strategic” behavior: the justices, who are in-
deed seeking their preferred outcome and operate within a framework that may not allow them to 
obtain their policy preferences, behave in a manner to secure their preferences as best they can.  
This necessitates negotiating with other actors, usually the other branches of government and fel-
low justices, and balancing incentives.  Where it is not possible to perfectly secure their policy 
preferences, the strategic model posits that justices will make concessions and negotiate with 
others in order to best generate their most preferred outcomes in the long run; the justices may 
not therefore always vote in line with their sincere policy preferences.   Three such models are of 
particular note.  The first, developed by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight in The Choices Justices 
Make (1998), views justices as seekers of legal policy who must behave in strategic ways in or-
der to achieve their desired outcomes.  This model takes into account how various normative in-
stitutions and interactions with colleagues and the other branches of government shape various 
decisions the justices make, including whether or not to hear the case and whether or not to file 
concurring or dissenting opinions.  The second prominent “rational choice” model, developed by 
Richard Pacelle, Brett Curry, and Bryan Marshall in Decision Making by the Modern Supreme 
Court (2011), highlights the differences in voting behavior between different types of cases, 
namely in constitutional vs. statutory cases and in economic vs. civil liberties cases.  They find 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Epstein & Knight (1998). 
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that the justices are more apt to behave strategically in statutory and economic cases and attitudi-
nally in constitutional and civil liberties cases.  Epstein has also developed another model, along 
with William Landes and Richard Posner, in The Behavior of Federal Judges.  This is a “labor-
market theory” of judicial decision-making, which sees federal judges as participants in a labor 
market constrained by normal economic concerns such as the risk of job loss, aversion to criti-
cism for their decisions, and the necessity of making trade-offs between the desire to engage in 
interesting and difficult work and the desire for leisure and effort aversion.  These incentives 
structure the federal decision-making process and the way in which judges interact with other 
actors, particularly higher courts and their compatriots. 
 Although the various strategic models present interesting and important challenges to the 
attitudinal model generally, they do not pose sufficient challenge to forego the attitudinal model 
for my purposes.  For one thing, the strategic models take into account a whole variety of cases, 
related both to civil liberties and to economic issues, and both statutory and constitutional in na-
ture.  Constitutional civil liberties cases are primarily influenced by the ideological attitudes of 
the justices,23 and it is precisely with such cases that I am concerned.  Additionally, for Congress 
to overturn a constitutional decision from the Supreme Court, they require a super-majority,24 a 
difficult task in a political body often divided along partisan lines; in any case, Congress rarely 
overturns the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court,25 and the Court, if it so desires, “can 
opt out of statutory mode and find constitutional basis for its decisions.”26  The labor-market the-
ory, on the other hand, may very well be suitable for analyzing the decision-making procedure of 
most federal court judges, but seems unsatisfactory for explaining Supreme Court justices’ deci-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Pacelle, Curry, & Marshall (2011). 24	  Ibid. 25	  Epstein & Knight (1998). 26	  Segal & Spaeth (2002), page 106. 
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sion-making.  Supreme Court justices have no motive to seek promotion, are in no danger of 
having their decisions overturned, “have greater power to change the law” and decide on more 
“novel cases” than do lower courts, opening up the possibility for them to be creative with their 
decisions,27 and “[t]he priors of a judge facing a novel case are likely to have a strong ideological 
component, because ideology is a worldview that gives one an initial take on a new problem.”28  
Therefore, in analysis of constitutional civil rights decisions by the Supreme Court, the strategic 
models provide no substantial benefit over the attitudinal model, which has been demonstrated to 
be an excellent predictor in search and seizure cases. 
Search and Seizure 
The Fourth Amendment 
Before delving into the attitudinal research regarding the justices’ decision-making in 
Fourth Amendment cases, it is necessary first to briefly elucidate the history of search and sei-
zure jurisprudence.  Protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, such as warrant re-
quirements, trace their heritage to the English common law,29 but became especially salient for 
Americans, who “had examples of abuses from the colonial era which they could point to in or-
der to justify the need for strong limits on the power of the government to conduct searches and 
seizures.”30  The American citizen’s right against unreasonable search and seizure was deemed 
of such great importance at the founding of the United States that it was included in the U.S. 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights, embodied in the Fourth Amendment.  The language of that 
amendment, although apparently simple, elegant, and straightforward, has nonetheless been the 
subject of some of the most bitterly contested legal controversies that have faced the Supreme 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Epstein, Landes, & Posner (2013), page 43. 28	  Ibid, page 45. 29	  McInnis (2009). 30	  Ibid page 17. 
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Court.  This is largely because even language that appears straightforward contains subtle nuanc-
es that render interpretation difficult: for example, what types of activities constitute a “search,” 
what exigent circumstances might make a search and seizure “unreasonable,” how specific the 
warrant must be in enumerating the place to be searched and items to be seized, and what excep-
tions might exist from the warrant requirement, are not immediately obvious from the language 
of the amendment. 
It is thus that the Supreme Court has found it necessary to define vague terms and give 
stronger legal foundation to Fourth Amendment guarantees.  The history of this amendment can 
be divided into two very broad eras: pre-incorporation and post-incorporation.  Prior to the ratifi-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the substantive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution applied 
only to the federal government; in Barron v. Baltimore,31 the Court held that the states were not 
bound by the mandates of the federal Constitution.  States were not compelled to recognize rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution until after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, when the 
Court began “incorporating” various rights.  “Incorporation” is “[t]he process whereby provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights are declared to be included in the due process guarantee of the Four-
teenth Amendment and are made applicable to state and local governments”32; the Fourth 
Amendment was not incorporated until 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado.33 
The pre-incorporation period saw some of the most transformative events in the devel-
opment of search and seizure jurisprudence, particularly the introduction of the exclusionary 
rule.  While the Fourth Amendment established the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure, that right initially had little substantive effect, as “[f]or more than a century 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 32	  Epstein & Walker (2011). 33	  338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
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after the American Revolution, American courts […] allowed evidence which was obtained 
through an illegal search and seizure to be admissible at trial.”34  This began to change around 
the turn of the 20th Century, and the Supreme Court finally gave substance to the Fourth 
Amendment with the establishment of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States.35  That 
rule basically holds that evidence seized in an illegal search is not admissible in a criminal trial.  
Although Weeks was a considerable victory for civil libertarians, the strengthening of Fourth 
Amendment guarantees was not to be long enjoyed.  During Prohibition, the Court began to es-
tablish various exceptions to the general rule that a duly required warrant is necessary for a 
search and seizure.36  Additionally, in the 1940’s, the Court began to expand exceptions to the 
warrant requirement for searches and seizures conducted incident to a lawful arrest,37 i.e. those 
searches and seizures conducted to secure the safety of the arresting officers and prevent the sus-
pect from destroying evidence. 
Throughout all of this development, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment only pro-
tected citizens from intrusions by the federal government; citizens would have to rely on guaran-
tees within state constitutions for protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.  This 
began to change when the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was incorporated in 
1949 in Wolf v. Colorado.  While this may appear to have been the dawning of a new era in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Wolf offered little substantive protection, as it did not incor-
porate the exclusionary rule; state officials were left free to use illegally seized evidence at trial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  McInnis (2009), page 21. 35	  232 U.S. 383 (1914). 36	  McInnis (2009).  See, e.g., Hester v. United States 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132 
(1925); Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  It is of particular not that these exceptions really began to 
take form during Prohibition.  My thesis attempts to establish a connection between the justices’ Fourth Amendment 
rulings and “social” case facts, especially case facts related to drugs; it is interesting that so many exceptions arose 
in response to Prohibition cases in the 1920’s, and that the “good faith” exception really began to take form as drug 
prohibition began to take its modern form as the “War on Drugs”—more on this later. 37	  Ibid.  See, e.g., Harris v. United States 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
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without penalty.  This changed with the Court’s landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio,38 bringing 
the Court to its modern interpretation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure.  Mapp 
represents the fullest realization of the Fourth Amendment’s substantive guarantees to date, en-
shrining the exclusionary rule to “serve as a deterrent to the potential excess of the police” in 
both federal and state contexts.39  But again, this outburst of civil libertarianism from the Court 
was merely ephemeral, and soon the substantive protection offered by the Fourth Amendment 
was undermined by the “good faith” exception.  This exception was established in two cases: for 
the federal government, in United States v. Leon;40 and for the states, in Massachusetts v. Shep-
herd.41  The exception basically holds that evidence seized in an unreasonable search is admissi-
ble at trial if the police had acted “in good faith,” i.e. that they reasonably believed their search to 
be valid.  While in context this may have appeared to be a qualified victory for civil libertarians, 
given the very real possibility of the Burger Court overturning the exclusionary rule altogether,42 
the “good faith” exception has been a major driving force in the narrowing of Fourth Amend-
ment protections that has occurred concurrent with the increasing conservatism of the Court.43 
 
Search & Seizure Research 
 It is clear that search and seizure jurisprudence is an area with a great degree of variabil-
ity and constant evolution.  To find a coherent logic in this area, which Fourth Amendment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 39	  Pacelle (2004), page 249. 40	  468 U.S. 897 (1984).  Interestingly, this case involves the seizure of drugs. 41	  468 U.S. 981 (1984).  Interestingly, although this case involves a gruesome murder, the original warrant had 
specified that the search was to be conducted for “controlled substances” (Pacelle (2004), page 253). 42	  Pacelle (2004). 43	  See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Hudson v. Michigan 547 U.S. 586 (2006); Herring v. United States 
555 U.S. 135 (2009); Kentucky v. King 563 U.S. ___ (2011). 
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scholars have frequently thought “are a mess,”44 would certainly be a tremendous feat.  Jeffrey 
Segal appears to have accomplished just such a feat through a series of studies (Segal 1984, 
1985, 1986) and through a book coauthored with Harold Spaeth (Segal & Spaeth 2002).  In each 
of these studies, he utilizes the attitudinal model, “hold[ing] that the justices base their deciions 
on the merits of the facts of the case juxtaposed against their personal policy preferences,”45 to 
predict the outcomes of search and seizure cases before the Court between the 1962 and 1981 
terms for the original series of articles and outcomes between the 1962 and 1998 terms in the 
book.  The cases are examined from the 1962 term because it is the first post-Mapp term, and 
therefore analysis is restricted to cases for which the fullest modern interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment applies.  Even critics of the attitudinal model agree that “[Segal’s] work basically 
defines the factors to be considered whenever one looks at these cases.”46  It is therefore neces-
sary to briefly describe Segal’s research so as to establish exactly what it is that I am studying. 
 Segal’s early research set out to discover “if [the justices’] policy preferences parallel a 
legal decision structure,”47 and largely succeeds at establishing the effect of judicial policy pref-
erences on the justices’ decision-making.  Constructing a successful model is difficult, especially 
considering that “there are about 500 different [legally relevant] factors affecting search and sei-
zure decisions.”48  Considering all of these factors would be a daunting task, even for such es-
teemed jurists as the justices of the Supreme Court: “it is [therefore] suggested herein that the 
justices monitor a relatively small number of facts from the case, and that the presence of these 
facts strongly predisposes the justice in his decision on the reasonableness of a search and sei-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Segal (1984), page 891). 45	  Segal & Spaeth (2002), page 312. 46	  Kritzer & Richards (2005), page 42. 47	  Segal (1984), page 892.  Specification of the parameters Segal considers is provided in Appendix A. 48	  Segal (1986), page 942. 
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zure.”49  Utilizing logit regression to estimate the impact of judicial policy preferences vis-á-vis 
case facts, Segal is able to establish a model that, in its most mature form, accurately predicts 
over 75% of the outcomes.50  This is a remarkable accomplishment, especially considering that 
prior to these studies social scientists regarded search and seizure jurisprudence as a cacopho-
nous mess.  However, as scientists, we cannot rest satisfied with a 75% prediction rate, and 
therefore must attempt to discover what other facts might affect the justices’ decisions.  As I 
have previously mentioned, the research to date leaves out considerations of “social” case facts.  
The justices of the Supreme Court are in a position, more than perhaps any other individual citi-
zens, to affect public policy, and it is therefore quite reasonable to suspect that their social policy 
preferences play a role in their decision-making.  I elaborate my methods for discovering the in-
fluence of these preferences below. 
Data & Methods 
 The model is based on that developed by Jeffrey Segal in a series of articles (1984, 1985, 
1986) and in his masterful book The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, coau-
thored with Harold Spaeth (2002).  Cases in the analyses are drawn from Segal’s “scamR” da-
taset.51  Two sets of independent variables are included in the model: first, those variables exam-
ined by Segal & Spaeth in Chapter 8 of The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited; 
and second, I have added variables bringing what I call “social” case facts, i.e. facts of the case 
that have no bearing on the legal status of the search, into the model.  The first set of variables 
incorporates “legal” case facts, specified in Appendix A.  The second set of independent varia-
bles includes what kinds of items were seized in the search and the crime for which criminal de-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Ibid. 50	  Segal & Spaeth (2002). 51	  Additional analyses, presented in Appendix B, are constructed using my own original dataset.  The appendix 
specifies the parameters of variables in the dataset.  
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fendants are charged.  Coding for this second set is drawn from the lower court’s decisions, ac-
quired through the LexisNexis Academic database; where LexisNexis provides no lower court 
decision, or the lower court decision provides insufficient information for coding, I draw facts 
from the next court down in the hierarchy.  Because I am concerned with outcomes in criminal 
cases, I have dropped non-criminal cases from the analyses, bringing the number of cases exam-
ined to 210. 
Specification: 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the decision of the Supreme Court as to the reasonableness of a search 
and seizure.  As in Segal (1984), the Supreme Court’s decisions are coded as 1 if the Court up-
holds the search (a “conservative” decision), and 0 if the Court strikes the search (a “liberal” de-
cision). 
Independent Variables 
Specification of the independent variables used by Segal and Spaeth (2002) is provided in 
Appendix A.  There is, however, one variable from that study that I have coded differently: 
Attitudes: Rather than use the Segal-Cover scores for the attitudes of the Court, I use the median 
justice’s Martin-Quinn score for each respective term as a proxy for the Court’s attitudes.  The 
Martin-Quinn scores have the advantage of changing between terms, and are thus better able to 
capture variability in the ideological leanings of the Court over time. 
“Social” case facts include 1) items that are seized in the relevant search and 2) the 
charges brought against the criminal defendant.  The variables for the items seized follow: 
Alcohol: If the police seized either non-tax alcoholic beverages or paraphernalia used for produc-
ing bootleg alcohol, the value is 1; if no alcohol is seized, the value is 0. 
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Drug: If the police seized controlled substances illegally possessed by the suspect, the value is 1; 
if no drugs were found on the suspect, the value is 0. 
Physical Evidence (PhysEv): Physical evidence includes blood, fiber, clothing, fingerprints, 
footprints, and other forensic evidence; this also includes evidence establishing violations of en-
vironmental or safety standards by businesses.  If police seized such items, the value is 1; if no 
such evidence was seized, the value is 0. 
Contraband: Contraband includes items used for nefarious or criminal purposes, such as gam-
bling paraphernalia or illicit checks.  If a search produced such items, the value is 1; if not, the 
value is 0. 
Weapon: If a search yields a weapon or weapons used in the commission of a crime, or weapons 
that are illegal to own, the value is 1; if no weapons were seized by police, the value is 0. 
Stolen Property (PropStol): If in the course of the search, the police find the suspect to be in pos-
session of stolen property, the value is 1; if the suspect is not found to be in possession of such 
items, the value is 0. 
Papers: Papers include ledgers and evidence of fraud or other financial crimes.  If a search yields 
such items, the value is 1; if no such evidence arises, the value is 0. 
 “Social facts” also include the types of charges criminal defendants face.  These charges 
are divided thusly: 
Personal Crimes (Person): If the suspect is charged with a crime that has a victim with whom 
the suspect had direct contact, such as murder, assault, rape, or armed robbery, the value is 1; if 
the crime did not involve contact between the perpetrator and the victim, the value is 0. 
Property Crimes (Property): If the suspect is charged with crimes such as larceny, auto theft, ar-
son, burglary, or other such crimes that do not involve direct contact between perpetrator and 
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victim, the value is 1; if the crime either involved such contact or did not involve infringements 
on the property rights of the victim, the value is 0. 
Financial Crimes (Finance): If the suspect is charged with crimes with financial gain as the mo-
tive that do not involve violation of a victim’s property rights, such as fraud, illicit gambling, or 
racketeering, the value is 1; if the charge is for other crimes, the value is 0. 
Possession (Possess):  If the defendant is charged with mere possession of controlled substances, 
the value is 1; if not, the value is 0. 
Trafficking (Traffic): If the suspect is charged with a crime involving the sale or distribution of 
controlled substances, i.e. possession with intent to distribute or narcotics trafficking, the value is 
1; if the charge is of a different nature, the value is 0. 
There are several charges that suspects face in these cases that do not neatly fit into these catego-
ries, such as smuggling of illegal immigrants, DUI/DWI, and illegal possession of firearms.  This 
variable is left out of the analysis: with a comprehensive set of variables, it is necessary to ex-
clude one variable for logit analysis to work. 
Analyses 
 I run two separate sets of analyses, each containing three separate analyses: the first set 
includes the lower court’s decisions as a variable, while the second substitutes [Attitudes] for the 
lower court decisions.  Within each set, the first analysis presents a reconstruction of Segal and 
Spaeth’s (2002) analysis as presented in Chapter 8 of The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal 
Model Revisited (substituting my Attitudes variable for theirs in the second set)52; the second 
analysis incorporates the crime variables, and the third includes the items seized variables.  The 
analyses are performed in two separate sets so as to avoid statistical noise caused by the signifi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  See Table 8.1 on page 318 and 8.3 on page 325. 
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cant correlation between Attitudes and the Lower Court Decision variable, and the analyses with-
in the sets are performed separately so as to avoid statistical noise caused by high correlations 
between certain items seized variables and certain crime variables.53  While analyzing the justic-
es individually may seem attractive, running such analyses generates a good deal of statistical 
noise for many justices who either have very few search and seizure decisions to their credit or 
whose decisions are highly correlated with one or more of the independent variables.54  All anal-
yses utilize logit regression. 
Results 
 Interpreting logit regression is a bit difficult, so a little preliminary is necessary.  Logit 
analysis expresses effects in terms of a coefficient that represents “the change in the log of the 
odds ration for a conservative decision given the presence of each variable.”55  Because this 
change is measured considering the increase (or decrease) in the likelihood of a conservative 
outcome, an increase in the likelihood of a conservative decision is expressed by a positive coef-
ficient, and a decrease in the likelihood of the Court upholding the search is reflected by a nega-
tive coefficient.  Larger coefficients represent greater impacts in the direction indicated by the 
sign.  The first set of tables (labeled “1.X”) incorporates the Lower Court Decision variable, 
while the second set (labeled “2.X”) incorporates Attitudes. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  For example, both the Possession and the Trafficking variables are highly correlated with the Drug variable, and 
the Papers variable is highly correlated with the Financial Crimes variable. 54	  It may be possible, in the future, to run analyses of the justices’ decisions according to ideological groupings, i.e. 
analyzing “Conservatives’” and “Liberals’” decisions separately.  55	  Segal & Spaeth (2002), page 317. 
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Table 1.1: Replication of Segal & Spaeth (2002) Determinants of Supreme Court Decisions with 
Lower Court Decision 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |  -2.391898   .8057586    -2.97   0.003    -3.971156   -.8126401 
    Business |  -2.002775   .8537333    -2.35   0.019    -3.676061    -.329488 
      Person |  -1.624912   .7812747    -2.08   0.038    -3.156183   -.0936421 
         Car |  -1.498233   .8254994    -1.81   0.070    -3.116182     .119716 
      Search |  -.9746464    .551262    -1.77   0.077      -2.0551    .1058073 
     Warrant |   1.256818   .6726427     1.87   0.062    -.0615379    2.575173 
    ProbCaus |  -.1329631    .431861    -0.31   0.758     -.979395    .7134688 
    Incident |   2.833364   1.165536     2.43   0.015     .5489557    5.117773 
       After |   .6695805   .5555078     1.21   0.228    -.4191948    1.758356 
    Unlawful |   .2385656   .5556707     0.43   0.668    -.8505289     1.32766 
  Exceptions |   1.184186   .3564586     3.32   0.001     .4855403    1.882832 
       LCDec |   -1.63291   .3578915    -4.56   0.000    -2.334365   -.9314561 
    Constant |   3.237089    .897748     3.61   0.000     1.477535    4.996643 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 The replication of Segal & Spaeth’s (2002) analysis56 yields promising results.  Dropping 
a few cases has reduced the measured effects and the significances a little bit, but virtually all of 
the variables that are significant in Segal & Spaeth’s analysis remain significant, and at similar 
levels (with the exception of the After Arrest variable, which was not highly significant in the 
original analysis).  For the most part, results reveal what observers would expect: houses are pro-
tected more than other potential locations of searches, and vehicles are protected least of all; the 
presence of a valid warrant increases the probability of a search being upheld.  Results are par-
ticularly interesting for the Probable Cause, Lower Court Decision, and Incident Arrest varia-
bles.  The lower court’s findings of Probable Cause have a negligible effect on decisions, and 
that effect is not significant.  It appears, then, that the Supreme Court does not give weight to this 
particular legal fact.  On the other hand, the Lower Court Decision is both highly significant and 
has a substantial effect.  It appears that the Supreme Court is quite apt to overturn the cases it 
hears.  This should not be entirely surprising, as the Court has a large amount of discretion over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  See Table 8.1, page 318. 
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which cases it hears, and the justices probably consider findings they disagree with more inter-
esting or feel more compelled to correct “mistakes” by the lower court.  The Incident Arrest var-
iable displays the largest impact of any variable and is quite significant.  This is, again, not en-
tirely surprising, considering that the exception to the warrant requirement for searches incident 
to arrest is “the most important” such exception.57  It is not difficult to see the rationale: searches 
incident to arrest are conducted to ensure police safety, and the Court would understandably be 
sympathetic to efforts by law enforcement to secure the safety of officers. 
Table 1.2: Determinants of Supreme Court Decisions with Crime Variables and Lower Court 
Decision 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |  -2.685757   .8431529    -3.19   0.001    -4.338306   -1.033208 
    Business |  -1.981927   .8783878    -2.26   0.024    -3.703535   -.2603181 
      Person |  -1.781697   .8118371    -2.19   0.028    -3.372868   -.1905251 
         Car |  -1.833905    .871309    -2.10   0.035     -3.54164   -.1261712 
      Search |  -.9606967   .5808653    -1.65   0.098    -2.099172    .1777784 
     Warrant |   1.107744   .6994109     1.58   0.113    -.2630763    2.478564 
    ProbCaus |  -.1087243   .4560059    -0.24   0.812    -1.002479    .7850309 
    Incident |    2.96345   1.233155     2.40   0.016     .5465119    5.380389 
       After |   .7920042   .5842821     1.36   0.175    -.3531677    1.937176 
    Unlawful |   .0823139   .5693267     0.14   0.885    -1.033546    1.198174 
  Exceptions |   1.280327   .3753234     3.41   0.001     .5447068    2.015948 
       LCDec |  -1.684982   .3895477    -4.33   0.000    -2.448481   -.9214825 
      Person |  -.1802821   .6512442    -0.28   0.782    -1.456697    1.096133 
    Property |  -.5254672    .729226    -0.72   0.471    -1.954724    .9037895 
     Finance |  -.3866403   .6967018    -0.55   0.579    -1.752151      .97887 
     Possess |  -.1790419    .679496    -0.26   0.792     -1.51083    1.152746 
     Traffic |   .8536044   .6362821     1.34   0.180    -.3934855    2.100694 
    Constant |   3.380726   .9784865     3.46   0.001     1.462928    5.298524 
 
 When the crime variables are added to the analysis, no radical changes occur.  The mag-
nitude of the effects and the significances vary somewhat, but not tremendously.  One exception 
is the Warrant variable, which becomes marginally significant; however, it is still very close to 
the .05 threshold for significance (one-tailed), and clearly still has a considerable effect on out-
comes.  Unfortunately, none of the crime variables exhibit strong effects on the outcomes, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Segal & Spaeth (2002), page 317. 
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none are significant.  This suggests that the type of charge the subject of the search faces general-
ly does not have much of an impact on the way the justices decide on the reasonableness of a 
search.  There is one variable, however, that arouses deeper interest.  The Trafficking variable 
yields the most substantial effect and the greatest level of significance.  Although it does not sat-
isfy the .05 threshold for labeling a variable significant, it has a p-value of .09 (one-tailed), which 
suggests the positive effect may not be entirely accidental. 
Table 1.3: Determinants of Supreme Court Decisions with Item Seized Variables and Lower 
Court Decision 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |   -2.26394   .8428859    -2.69   0.007    -3.915966   -.6119138 
    Business |  -1.718334   .8876857    -1.94   0.053    -3.458166     .021498 
      Person |  -1.426532   .8247763    -1.73   0.084    -3.043064    .1900002 
         Car |  -1.534873   .8891739    -1.73   0.084    -3.277622    .2078753 
      Search |  -.8197494   .5797023    -1.41   0.157    -1.955945    .3164462 
     Warrant |   1.287614    .696229     1.85   0.064    -.0769695    2.652198 
    ProbCaus |  -.2370062   .4455222    -0.53   0.595    -1.110214    .6362012 
    Incident |   2.688411    1.20158     2.24   0.025     .3333573    5.043465 
       After |   .7490353   .5767973     1.30   0.194    -.3814666    1.879537 
    Unlawful |   .2140542   .5807619     0.37   0.712    -.9242182    1.352327 
  Exceptions |   1.331933   .3760138     3.54   0.000     .5949593    2.068906 
       LCDec |  -1.633856   .3720864    -4.39   0.000    -2.363132   -.9045797 
     Alcohol |   .2390123   1.026133     0.23   0.816    -1.772172    2.250197 
        Drug |   .7602951   .4669233     1.63   0.103    -.1548577    1.675448 
      PhysEv |   .2441712   .6700269     0.36   0.716    -1.069057      1.5574 
  Contraband |   1.314448   .8980009     1.46   0.143    -.4456016    3.074497 
      Weapon |   .4452736   .7225092     0.62   0.538    -.9708184    1.861366 
    PropStol |    1.12022   .7792787     1.44   0.151    -.4071387    2.647578 
      Papers |   .0557942   .6427623     0.09   0.931    -1.203997    1.315585 
    Constant |   2.448966   .9819065     2.49   0.013     .5244643    4.373467 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 Again, adding the items seized variables to the analysis, while it does decrease observed 
effects and significances slightly, does not radically alter results gleamed from the initial analy-
sis.  The items seized variables are what make this analysis particularly exciting.  Although none 
of these variables surpasses the .05 threshold of significance, a few come very close.  The two 
variables with the largest effect, Contraband and Stolen Property, are at least marginally signifi-
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cant,58 and may very well therefore have a real effect on the Court’s decisions.  The most inter-
esting result regards the Drug variable.  While the effect of this variable is not large relative to 
the effects of the legal variables, it is larger than the other items seized variables (except for the 
Contraband and Stolen Property variables), and comes extremely close to the threshold of signif-
icance.59  This is in line with my hypothesis that drug variables in particular have a real effect on 
the decision-making of the Court.  As we shall see, this hypothesis bears out in the second set of 
analyses as well. 
Table 2.1: Replication of Segal & Spaeth (2002) Determinants of Supreme Court Decisions with 
Attitudes 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |  -2.164933   .8109576    -2.67   0.008    -3.754381   -.5754856 
    Business |  -1.889272   .8701379    -2.17   0.030    -3.594711   -.1838334 
      Person |  -1.712625   .7946929    -2.16   0.031    -3.270195   -.1550557 
         Car |  -1.608922   .8348676    -1.93   0.054    -3.245232    .0273883 
      Search |  -1.368918   .5633229    -2.43   0.015    -2.473011   -.2648256 
     Warrant |   .4496884   .6526395     0.69   0.491    -.8294615    1.728838 
    ProbCaus |   .0075403   .4206702     0.02   0.986    -.8169582    .8320388 
    Incident |   2.622965   1.154621     2.27   0.023     .3599503     4.88598 
       After |   .7057111   .5412764     1.30   0.192    -.3551712    1.766593 
    Unlawful |   .1185073   .5526139     0.21   0.830     -.964596    1.201611 
  Exceptions |   1.066083   .3465955     3.08   0.002     .3867679    1.745397 
   Attitudes |   1.327306   .3239359     4.10   0.000     .6924035    1.962209 
    Constant |   2.516713    .892268     2.82   0.005     .7679003    4.265527 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 Once again, the replication of Segal & Spaeth’s (2002) analysis60 yields rather unsurpris-
ing results.  The coefficients are rather different between his and my results as a result of differ-
ing parameters for the Attitudes variable, but significances tend to hold.  The one exception is the 
Warrant variable, which loses substantially in significance.  Aside from this anomaly, the analy-
sis here appears consistent with Segal & Spaeth’s findings. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Contraband: p=.072; Stolen Property: p=.076 (one-tailed). 59	  Drug: p=.052 (one-tailed). 60	  See table 8.3, page 325. 
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Table 2.2: Determinants of Supreme Court Decisions with Crime Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |  -2.294253    .817968    -2.80   0.005     -3.89744   -.6910649 
    Business |   -1.81748   .8763721    -2.07   0.038    -3.535138    -.099822 
      Person |  -1.801536   .8014345    -2.25   0.025    -3.372318   -.2307528 
         Car |  -1.807537   .8553008    -2.11   0.035    -3.483896   -.1311782 
      Search |  -1.294726   .5922368    -2.19   0.029    -2.455489   -.1339635 
     Warrant |   .2384102   .6715785     0.35   0.723    -1.077859     1.55468 
    ProbCaus |   .0845811   .4327495     0.20   0.845    -.7635924    .9327546 
    Incident |   2.508984   1.157506     2.17   0.030     .2403142    4.777653 
       After |   .8039112   .5656794     1.42   0.155       -.3048    1.912622 
    Unlawful |   .0792553   .5646206     0.14   0.888    -1.027381    1.185891 
  Exceptions |   1.112004   .3639406     3.06   0.002     .3986935    1.825314 
   Attitudes |   1.194316   .3338945     3.58   0.000     .5398945    1.848737 
      Person |  -.5714519   .6183184    -0.92   0.355    -1.783334    .6404298 
    Property |  -1.010938     .67482    -1.50   0.134    -2.333561    .3116846 
     Finance |    -.37872   .6794036    -0.56   0.577    -1.710327    .9528867 
     Possess |  -.1465091   .6619976    -0.22   0.825    -1.444001    1.150982 
     Traffic |   .2551436    .584986     0.44   0.663    -.8914079    1.401695 
    Constant |   2.803114   .9596639     2.92   0.003     .9222069     4.68402 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 As in the first set of analyses above, the addition of the crime variables yields no radical 
divergence in results.  The coefficients for the crime variables themselves are not substantial (ex-
cept for the Property Crimes variable), and none are significant.  Unfortunately, where it ap-
peared above as if the Trafficking variable might have interesting potential as an influential case 
fact, it here loses tremendously in both significance and effect.  On the other hand, the Property 
Crimes variable has gained both in effect and in significance.61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Property Crimes: p=.067 (one-tailed). 
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Table 2.3: Determinants of Supreme Court Decisions with Items Seized Variables and Attitudes 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |  -1.978821   .8470141    -2.34   0.019    -3.638938   -.3187041 
    Business |  -1.576629   .9015412    -1.75   0.080    -3.343618    .1903591 
      Person |  -1.484758   .8291233    -1.79   0.073     -3.10981    .1402934 
         Car |  -1.599051   .8857483    -1.81   0.071    -3.335086    .1369842 
      Search |  -1.207959    .583386    -2.07   0.038    -2.351374   -.0645432 
     Warrant |   .4324144   .6688467     0.65   0.518    -.8785011     1.74333 
    ProbCaus |  -.1142442   .4363228    -0.26   0.793    -.9694212    .7409328 
    Incident |   2.585449   1.173286     2.20   0.028     .2858504    4.885048 
       After |   .7789022   .5559091     1.40   0.161    -.3106596    1.868464 
    Unlawful |   .1236284   .5761096     0.21   0.830    -1.005526    1.252782 
  Exceptions |   1.190585   .3654454     3.26   0.001     .4743254    1.906845 
   Attitudes |   1.386833   .3467541     4.00   0.000     .7072073    2.066459 
     Alcohol |   .2056744   1.148818     0.18   0.858    -2.045968    2.457317 
        Drug |   .7739428   .4547982     1.70   0.089    -.1174454    1.665331 
      PhysEv |   .1463616   .6826889     0.21   0.830    -1.191684    1.484407 
  Contraband |   1.311768   .8805566     1.49   0.136    -.4140914    3.037627 
      Weapon |   .4176446   .6885204     0.61   0.544    -.9318306     1.76712 
    PropStol |   1.004833   .7379163     1.36   0.173     -.441456    2.451123 
      Papers |   .4215464   .6548645     0.64   0.520    -.8619644    1.705057 
    Constant |    1.64144   .9699182     1.69   0.091    -.2595651    3.542444 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 Adding the items seized variables does not much alter the significances or effects of the 
variables already considered in the base analysis.  In this set of analyses, however, the drug vari-
able becomes significant at the .05 level and has a considerable positive effect on the justices’ 
decision-making.62  Considering this finding in conjunction with the similar result in Table 1.3, it 
appears that the members of the Court do indeed weigh the seizure of drugs differently than other 
seizures, even when we control for the effects of other variables.  For at least this variable, then, 
it appears that the justices allow their social policy preferences to invade their decision-making 
processes. 
 In order to assess the magnitude of the impact of the Drug variable on the Court’s deci-
sion, I will compare the differences in probabilities of the Court’s finding the search reasonable 
depending on the presence of the Drug variable with the differences in probabilities of the 
Court’s finding the search reasonable depending on the presence of a variable that has a highly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Drug: p=.046 (one-tailed). 
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significant and substantial effect, namely the House variable.  Probabilities for variables are cal-
culated based on 10,000 simulations of the analysis in Stata, holding all other variables at their 
median value.63  These probabilities are presented in two tables: Table 1.4 takes probabilities 
from analyses run with the Lower Court Decision variable, and Table 2.4 takes probabilities 
from analyses that include the Attitudes variable. 
Table 1.4:  Probabilities of Court Rulings for House and Drug, from the Analysis with Lower 
Court Decisions 
House=0 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
            Pr(sctdec=lib) |   .1931064     .1263229     .0354893    .5090262 
            Pr(sctdec=con) |   .8068936     .1263229     .4909738    .9645107 
 
House=1 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
            Pr(sctdec=lib) |   .6434055     .1269509      .371308    .8596699 
            Pr(sctdec=con) |   .3565945     .1269509     .1403301     .628692 
 
Drug=0 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
            Pr(sctdec=lib) |   .1931064     .1263229     .0354893    .5090262 
            Pr(sctdec=con) |   .8068936     .1263229     .4909738    .9645107 
 
Drug=1 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
            Pr(sctdec=lib) |   .1069839     .0818498     .0173616    .3267078 
            Pr(sctdec=con) |   .8930161     .0818498     .6732922    .9826384 
 
 If the value of the House variable is 0, the Supreme Court has about an 81% chance of 
upholding a search.  This probability drops dramatically, to about 36%, if the value of the House 
variable is 1.  This is exactly what we would expect given the large negative coefficient and high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  See King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) pp. 349-359 for further elaboration of simulation-based analysis. 
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significance of the House variable.64  If the Drug variable is coded 0, the court has a nearly 81% 
chance of finding a search and seizure reasonable; this probability increases to over 89% if the 
value of the Drug variable is 1.  This is consistent with the smaller, positive coefficient and mar-
ginal level of significance this variable achieves in the analysis.65  It appears that the presence of 
drugs in a particular case has a not inconsiderable impact on the justices’ findings of the reason-
ableness of a search, though not as substantial an impact as other case facts. 
Table 2.4: Probabilities of Court Rulings for House and Drug, from the Analysis with Attitudes 
House=0 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
            Pr(sctdec=lib) |   .2642012     .1431251     .0606815    .6053076 
            Pr(sctdec=con) |   .7357988     .1431251     .3946924    .9393185 
 
House=1 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
            Pr(sctdec=lib) |   .6827369     .1130212      .438225    .8715753 
            Pr(sctdec=con) |   .3172631     .1130212     .1284247     .561775 
 
Drug=0 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
            Pr(sctdec=lib) |   .2642012     .1431251     .0606815    .6053076 
            Pr(sctdec=con) |   .7357988     .1431251     .3946924    .9393185 
 
Drug=1 
 
 
      Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------------- 
            Pr(sctdec=lib) |   .1514127     .1018448     .0276841     .422271 
            Pr(sctdec=con) |   .8485873     .1018448      .577729    .9723159 
 
 The probabilities of the Supreme Court’s decisions for variants of the House and Drug 
variables from the analysis with Attitudes yields results very similar to those presented in Table 
1.4.  Once again, the probability of the Supreme Court upholding a search drops considerably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  See Table 1.3. 65	  Supra. 
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(from ~74& to ~32%) if the search and seizure took place at the suspect’s home, once again con-
sistent with the variable’s large, negative coefficient and high level of significance.66  The Drug 
variable also yields similar probabilities to those presented in Table 1.4, but the difference is 
slightly more substantial: the probability that the Court upholds a search increases from almost 
74% to just below 85% if drugs are seized from the defendant; the larger effect is due to the 
greater degree of significance and larger coefficient this variable achieves in the analysis with 
attitudes.67  Once again, it appears that the presence of drugs in a case leads the justices to make 
more conservative decisions than they would were drugs not a factor in the case. 
Conclusion 
 It appears that, by and large, social facts do not much influence the decisions of the jus-
tices.  The charges defendants face make little difference in the evaluation of searches and sei-
zures by the Court, as does the type of thing seized from the subject of the search.  The one nota-
ble exception is the Drug variable, which does indeed influence the decision-making of the jus-
tices in a more conservative direction.  What is it that causes the justices to look differently, and 
particularly more restrictively, on drugs than on other species of evidence?  A potential explana-
tion may be that the federal government has not waged a social, moral and political War on other 
items: there is no general “War on Weapons,” “War on Ledgers,” or “War on Gambling Para-
phernalia”; there is, however, a strident and unwavering “War on Drugs.”  Very public and in-
tensive anti-drug efforts of lawmakers and law enforcement and the strong political rhetoric of 
the Drug War may make political attitudes regarding drugs more salient for the justices than atti-
tudes they may hold regarding the prosecution of other types of crimes or the seizure of other 
items.  It is interesting to note that many of the opinions that have moved the Court in a more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  See Table 2.3. 67	  Supra. 
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conservative direction have come out of cases having to do with the seizure of drugs.68  This is 
particularly disturbing for civil libertarians and other critics of the War on Drugs, and offers con-
firmation of fears that this policy has led to a curtailment of Constitutionally-guaranteed rights 
through the Courts, who ought not be legislating their social policy preferences.  If, however, 
critics become aware of the Court’s behavior in this arena, they may be able to call public atten-
tion to the justices’ social legislating, and potentially exercise some influence over how the jus-
tices decide cases.  Considering the history and the science of judicial decision making, this may 
unfortunately be too much to hope for, but it is certainly worth trying. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Particularly United States v. Leon, which established the “good faith” exception. 
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Appendix A: Coding For Segal & Spaeth (2002) Dataset69 
 
All coding is drawn from the lower court decision, except for the Exceptions variable, 
which draws on the Supreme Court’s findings.  The Attitudes variable is different in my anal-
yses: where Segal & Spaeth use Segal Cover scores to measure the Court’s attitudes, I use the 
median justice’s Martin Quinn score for the relevant term. 
House:          0=No  1=Yes 
Business:      0=No  1=Yes 
Person:        0=No  1=Yes 
Car:              0=No  1=Yes 
Search:        0=Less intrusive activities such as frisks 1=Full search 
Warrant:       0=No  1=Yes 
Probable Cause (ProbCaus):  0=No  1=Yes 
Incident Arrest (Incident):  0=No  1=Yes 
After Arrest (After):   0=No  1=Yes 
After Unlawful Arrest (Unlawful): 0=No  1=Yes 
Exceptions: Additive Index: Starts 0, +1 for each exception found by 
the Court 
Lower Court Decision (LCDec): 0=Struck 1=Upheld 
Attitudes: Median justice’s Martin-Quinn score for the respective 
term.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  The parameters, while not explicitly laid out in the Segal & Spaeth (2002) study, are elaborated in Segal (1984); 
however, the three arrest variables are coded simply according to the lower court’s finding, not according to the pro-
portion of lower court justices findings pertaining to the status of the arrest as in Segal (1984). 
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Appendix B: Results From my own Dataset 
Methods: 
In addition to replicating Segal & Spaeth’s (2002) analysis and inserting my own varia-
bles into their dataset, I have constructed my own dataset.  The parameters are identical between 
our datasets regarding the Segal & Spaeth (2002) Chapter 8 analyses70, but I have quibbled with 
Segal & Spaeth’s coding in a few cases; the differences are for the most part minor.  The most 
significant divergence between my coding and theirs is that where Segal & Spaeth drew from 
Supreme Court decisions for the [Exceptions] variable, I rely entirely on the lower court’s opin-
ions, so as to avoid the circularity problem of relying on information from Supreme Court deci-
sions to predict those very decisions.   
Results: 
Table B.1: Replication of Segal & Spaeth (2002) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |   -.227815   .7280121    -0.31   0.754    -1.654692    1.199063 
    Business |  -.3079383   .7708476    -0.40   0.690    -1.818772    1.202895 
      Person |  -.2347855   .7185278    -0.33   0.744    -1.643074    1.173503 
         Car |   .4117651   .7536967     0.55   0.585    -1.065453    1.888983 
      Search |  -.4833279   .5100833    -0.95   0.343    -1.483073     .516417 
     Warrant |   .8344959    .622911     1.34   0.180    -.3863872    2.055379 
    ProbCaus |  -.3415211   .4226862    -0.81   0.419    -1.169971    .4869287 
    Incident |   .5312885   .7822494     0.68   0.497    -1.001892    2.064469 
       After |   .3875659   .6479481     0.60   0.550    -.8823891    1.657521 
    Unlawful |  -.4230044    .547786    -0.77   0.440    -1.496645    .6506364 
  Exceptions |    .273615   .5591493     0.49   0.625    -.8222974    1.369528 
       LCDec |  -2.378084   .4109391    -5.79   0.000     -3.18351   -1.572658 
    Constant |   2.043622   .8177442     2.50   0.012     .4408723    3.646371 
 
 
Table B.1 presents a replication of the Segal & Spaeth (2002) analyses, using my own da-
taset in the model.  It appears that my minor quibbling with Segal’s coding produces results that 
are radically divergent from those presented in The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model.  
With the sole exception of the [Lower Court Decision] variable, not a single variable has a sig-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  See Appendix A. 
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nificant impact on the Supreme Court’s findings of the reasonableness of the search.  While dis-
appointing, these results are not entirely disheartening: they may suggest that Segal’s (1984) as-
sertion “that beneath the so-called mess of search and seizure decisions lies a coherent set of de-
cisions” (892) may not be entirely accurate, or if it exists, that it perhaps has not yet been discov-
ered.  If that is the case, and search and seizure jurisprudence is more enigmatic than has been 
thought since Segal’s groundbreaking studies, then political scientists are faced with an intensely 
interesting and much more complex set of problems in this research area.  
Table B.2: Crime Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |  -.3152322   .7313407    -0.43   0.666    -1.748634    1.118169 
    Business |  -.0917074   .7852252    -0.12   0.907    -1.630721    1.447306 
      Person |   -.312667   .7269263    -0.43   0.667    -1.737416    1.112082 
         Car |    .301058   .7615925     0.40   0.693    -1.191636    1.793752 
      Search |  -.5607377   .5274522    -1.06   0.288    -1.594525    .4730496 
     Warrant |   .8122678   .6221565     1.31   0.192    -.4071366    2.031672 
    ProbCaus |  -.2822678   .4285686    -0.66   0.510    -1.122247    .5577113 
    Incident |   .7003181   .8160748     0.86   0.391    -.8991592    2.299795 
       After |    .416585   .6655528     0.63   0.531    -.8878745    1.721045 
    Unlawful |  -.4237763   .5577624    -0.76   0.447     -1.51697    .6694179 
  Exceptions |   .3455581   .5793693     0.60   0.551    -.7899849    1.481101 
       LCDec |  -2.401282   .4241952    -5.66   0.000     -3.23269   -1.569875 
      Person |   -.127184   .6129194    -0.21   0.836    -1.328484    1.074116 
    Property |  -.5766372   .6498684    -0.89   0.375    -1.850356    .6970814 
     Finance |  -.3689244    .646339    -0.57   0.568    -1.635726    .8978768 
     Possess |   .0984244    .652374     0.15   0.880    -1.180205    1.377054 
     Traffic |   .5100059   .5697591     0.90   0.371    -.6067014    1.626713 
    Constant |    2.11593   .9174613     2.31   0.021     .3177391    3.914121 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Tables B.2 and B.3, incorporating the items seized and crime variables respectively, re-
veal much the same results as does the bare recreation of Segal & Spaeth’s (2002) analysis.  No-
tably, the significance of several of the variables increases, particularly the [House] variable, 
while that of some others (i.e. the Business variable) decreases.  The impact of the original varia-
bles also varies quite a bit.  While these results continue to be a bit disappointing, there is a silver 
Page 33 of 36	  
lining: as in the analysis from the Segal dataset, the Drug variable is quite a bit more significant 
than the other items seized variables, and has a sizeable positive effect. 
Table B.3: Item Seized Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       House |  -.3947731   .7672154    -0.51   0.607    -1.898488    1.108942 
    Business |  -.2640855   .8208727    -0.32   0.748    -1.872966    1.344795 
      Person |  -.3539741   .7544842    -0.47   0.639    -1.832736    1.124788 
         Car |   .0276325   .7874355     0.04   0.972    -1.515713    1.570978 
      Search |  -.5334778   .5370523    -0.99   0.321    -1.586081    .5191254 
     Warrant |   .9701356   .6583053     1.47   0.141    -.3201191     2.26039 
    ProbCaus |  -.5674321   .4388484    -1.29   0.196    -1.427559     .292695 
    Incident |   .5061086   .8129362     0.62   0.534    -1.087217    2.099434 
       After |    .486106   .6627647     0.73   0.463    -.8128889    1.785101 
    Unlawful |   -.463944   .5739864    -0.81   0.419    -1.588937    .6610487 
  Exceptions |   .4011036   .5812586     0.69   0.490    -.7381423     1.54035 
       LCDec |  -2.402295   .4226766    -5.68   0.000    -3.230725   -1.573864 
     Alcohol |   -1.23767   1.109689    -1.12   0.265    -3.412622    .9372807 
        Drug |   .6649523    .476592     1.40   0.163    -.2691509    1.599056 
      PhysEv |   .3226601   .6778927     0.48   0.634    -1.005985    1.651305 
  Contraband |   1.029572   .8631039     1.19   0.233    -.6620805    2.721224 
      Weapon |   .7635403   .7133602     1.07   0.284    -.6346199    2.161701 
    PropStol |   .8905863   .7886872     1.13   0.259    -.6552123    2.436385 
      Papers |  -.1079723    .666989    -0.16   0.871    -1.415247    1.199302 
    Constant |   1.889686   .8815272     2.14   0.032     .1619249    3.617448 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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